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Note
THE NEW EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION ACT: THE FUNCTIONALITY
AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BIOMETRICS IN THE HIRING PROCESS
GRAYSON COLT HOLMES
In 1990, Congress created the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform to assess and make recommendations regarding the
implementation and impact of U.S. immigration policy. Unanimously, the
Commission proposed employment-based immigration reforms that have
lead to the creation of E-Verify, an Internet-based electronic verification
system used by employers to verify a prospective worker’s eligibility.
Today, the system compares a prospective worker’s identification
information, such as her name, date of birth, and social security number
with information contained in databases housed by the Department of
Homeland Security and Social Security Administration. Several members
of Congress, however, have proposed legislation that would require
prospective workers to submit biometric information to curb identity fraud
and existing shortfalls in the verification process.
This Note examines the practical and legal implications of a nationally
mandated biometric verification system and whether such a system is
constitutionally viable under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Ultimately this Note argues that no matter how unsettling the collection of
biometric information by the government may be, at least in the
employment hiring context, a nationally mandated biometric verification
system will most likely pass constitutional muster.
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THE NEW EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION ACT: THE FUNCTIONALITY
AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BIOMETRICS IN THE HIRING PROCESS
GRAYSON COLT HOLMES*
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2009, in an effort to prevent illegal immigrants from obtaining
employment in the United States, six congressional legislators unveiled a
plan to require prospective workers to submit biometric information
through a national employment verification program.1 The bill, which
today remains in committee, threatens to foist a technology on American
workers and employers that many have only seen in the movies. If the bill
is passed, employers who use the verification system would collect from
prospective workers not only social security numbers, birth certificates,
and I-91 forms, but also biometric identification images of fingerprints,
irises, and faces. A nationally mandated system that collects this
information raises a host of legal questions, including whether such a
requirement constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, and
whether such a system would unduly violate societal expectations of
privacy.
This Note addresses common misperceptions and legal concerns about
such a nationally mandated system and examines whether such a system
could work in practice and under existing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Part II of this Note delves into the history of employment
verification in the United States and Congress’s struggle to find the perfect
automated system. Part III surveys the federal government’s biometric
activities since the September 11th terrorists attacks and evaluates current
technological capabilities. Part IV explores the Fourth Amendment and
privacy implications of a biometric requirement in a national employment
verification program. Finally, the Note concludes that a biometric
requirement has the potential to meet congressional immigration goals
without impinging on the rights of prospective workers, but it cannot exist
until the government strengthens existing departmental structures and
allocates new resources for a national employment verification system.
The stigma attached to the government’s recording of bodily
* University of Georgia, A.B. 2007; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D Candidate
2011. I would like to thank Professor Kaaryn Gustafson for her insightful comments and guidance
during the creation of this Note. I would also like to thank the members of the Connecticut Law Review
for their keen eyes during the editing process, especially Ashley Schaefer for her encouragement and
advice. This note is dedicated to my great-grandfather, the late Harold J. Smith. All errors are mine
and mine alone.
1
H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. (2009).
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information is enormous. This Note’s purpose is not to remove that
stigma. Rather, it attempts to quell privacy and Fourth Amendment
concerns that may arise from the use of existing biometric technology in
the prospective worker-employer context.
Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and societal expectations of privacy continually change with
the needs of the public interest and developments in technology. This Note
attempts to reconcile those competing interests and argues that a national
employee verification system that extracts biometric information is
constitutionally viable.
II. EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION IN AMERICA
A. The Evolution of Electronic Eligibility Verification Systems
In 1990, Congress authorized a bipartisan commission, known as the
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (Immigration Reform
Commission), to evaluate the implementation and impact of U.S.
immigration policy.2 The Immigration Reform Commission first pitched
the idea of a national electronic eligibility verification (EEV) system in a
report to Congress in 1994.3 The report noted that the promise of
employment in the United States serves as one of the strongest attractions
drawing many illegal immigrants to the country.4 Past “open borders”
immigration policies had encouraged, according to libertarian critics,
undocumented immigrants to come to the United States to seek education
and employment.5 Likewise, segments of the U.S. economy have and still
rely heavily on immigrants to perform tasks that many American workers
were reluctant to perform.6
2
Congress mandated the Immigration Reform Commission through the Immigration Act of 1990.
The Act charged the Immigration Reform Commission to release two reports—an interim report in
1994 and a final report in 1997—detailing major immigration-related issues facing the United States.
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–649, § 141(a)–(b), 104 Stat. 4978, 5001–02 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, 1994 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY i (1994).
3
See DORIS MEISSNER & MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE NEXT
GENERATION OF E-VERIFY: GETTING EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION RIGHT 4 (2009) (stating that the
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform recommended that Congress create an electronic eligibility
verification system to end document fraud); U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 2, at
xiii–xviii (explaining the benefits of a computerized verification system and the proposed features of a
pilot program).
4
U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 2, at xii (stating the need to decrease the
employment magnet).
5
See Jim Harper, Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification: Franz Kafka’s Solution to
Illegal Immigration, 612 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 4 (2008), available at
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9256 (explaining the “open borders” policy during the
early part of American history and how Congress passed legislation encouraging immigration to
overcome the labor shortage caused by the Civil War).
6
See, e.g., PARR ROSSON ET AL., NAT’L MILK PRODUCERS FED’N, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
IMMIGRATION ON U.S. DAIRY FARMS 2 (2009), available at http://nmpf.org/latest-news/pressreleases/jun-2009/nmpf-study-finds-dairy-farms-rely-heavily-on-foreign-workers (stating that dairy
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The Immigration Reform Commission noted that one goal that should
underpin any successful national immigration policy is “reducing the
employment magnet.”7 To this end, the Immigration Reform Commission
recommended a national program that hinged its success on worksite and
employer enforcement. The recommended plan called for employers to
leverage a computerized national identity verification program to curb
identity fraud, while the federal government would ensure employer
compliance through the imposition of penalties and fines for employers
who employed unauthorized workers.8
In response to the Immigration Reform Commission’s report, Congress
created three electronic verification pilot programs to test the effectiveness
of a national EEV system in which employers could voluntarily enroll.9 It
charged the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) and Social
Security Administration (SSA) with the task of commencing the three
programs, and all three were fully implemented by 1997.10 Of the three
programs, the “Basic Pilot” (renamed “E-Verify”) proved the most
farmers employ 57,000 foreign-born immigrants or forty-one percent of their workforce and that
eliminating immigrant labor would reduce the U.S. dairy herd by 1.34 million head, reduce milk
production by 29.5 billion pounds, and reduce the number of dairy farms by 4,532, increasing milk
prices by about sixty-one percent). But see STEVEN A. CAMAROTA & KAREN JENSENIUS, CTR. FOR
IMMIGRATION STUDIES, JOBS AMERICANS WON’T DO?: A DETAILED LOOK AT IMMIGRANT
EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.cis.org/illegalimmigrationemployment (stating that a 2005–2007 survey found that there were only a small number of majorityimmigrant occupations and that immigrants do not take jobs Americans want).
7
U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 2, at xii; see also Save America
Comprehensive Immigration Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 750 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 187
(2007) (statement of T.J. Bonner, National President, National Border Patrol Council of the American
Federation of Government Employees AFL-CIO) (stating that proposed solutions have failed to curb
illegal immigration because they have not “reduced the employment magnet”). Notably, only one
federal court has acknowledged the “employment magnet” that Congress has “endeavored to turn-off.”
See Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thornburgh, 718 F. Supp. 820, 822–23 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (deferring to
the government’s overriding interest in immigration control and upholding sanctions against an
employer who knowingly employed an illegal alien because reversing sanctions would “reactivat[e] the
employment ‘magnet’”).
8
U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 2, at xiii–xiv, xix–xx.
9
MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 4; Harper, supra note 5, at 5. These three programs
are the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot Program (CAVPP), the Machine-Readable Document
Pilot Program (MRDPP), and the Basic Pilot Program (E-Verify). Id. at 5. The blueprints for each
plan were laid out in Title IV of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996. Pub. L. 104-208, §§ 401−05, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 655−66 (1996) (codified at 8 USC § 1324a et
seq.).
10
Lindsay L. Chichester & Gregory P. Adams, The State of E-Verify: What Every Employer
Should Know, 56 FED. LAW., July 2009, at 50, 50. CAVPP allowed workers to attest to their
citizenship status, which was then electronically checked against information in INS databases.
Unsurprisingly, ineligible workers attested to being citizens, and many employers rarely sought out
fraud. Some employers, however, discriminated against work-authorized noncitizens because of the
liability risks associated with the worker’s presence. MRDPP was initiated in Iowa because of the
state’s machine-readable driver’s licenses and ID cards. The program suffered from technical
difficulties in reading the IDs and was undermined by the state’s transition away from using SSNs on
driver’s licenses. Both CAVPP and MRDPP were terminated by the Department of Homeland Security
in 2003. Harper, supra note 5, at 5.
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successful and is the current model of success for Congress’s national
immigration reform campaign.11
E-Verify was first implemented in the five states that Commission
officials said “had the highest estimated numbers of undocumented
immigrants: California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas.”12
Employers in those states were not required to use the system, but instead
voluntarily registered to participate.13 Two years later, the program
expanded to include Nebraska.14 By 2003, E-Verify had expanded to all
fifty states and the two other pilot programs had been discontinued.15
Although the INS initially oversaw E-Verify’s implementation, it was
reconfigured in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the SSA currently operate E-Verify’s
internet-based database.16
E-Verify works by checking information—name, date of birth, social
security number (SSN) and, for non-citizens, alien identification number—
provided to the employer by the prospective worker.17 Employers must
“submit this information through a secure website within three days after
[the] worker is hired.”18 The program then checks the worker-provided
information against the SSA’s main database, called “Numident,” if she is
a citizen, or, if she is a noncitizen, against the DHS composite system,
called the “Verification Information System” or “VIS.”19 If the worker’s
information matches the records on either Numident or VIS, E-Verify
returns a confirmation to the employer through the website, and the worker
is cleared to work.20 When the information cannot be verified through the
database, E-Verify responds with a tentative non-confirmation (TNC).21
The law then shifts the burden to the worker; the employer must inform the
worker of her status and provide her with procedural instructions to contest

11
Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 50; see also MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at
4 (stating that Basic Pilot became a national voluntary program in 2003 and now operates as E-Verify);
Harper, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that Basic Pilot, which was renamed “E-Verify,” “is the remaining
effort to verify work eligibility electronically”).
12
Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 50. In May of 2008, E-Verify had been used by most
states on a voluntary basis, while ten required the use of E-Verify for public or private employers.
Lizzette Romero, Note, E-Verify: Expansion and Recent Developments, 4 ISJLP 605, 610 (2008).
13
Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 50.
14
Id.
15
Id.; Harper, supra note 5, at 5.
16
Peter F. Asaad & Stephanie S. Wesley, E-Verify: A Trojan Horse at the Employer’s Doorstep,
BUS. L. BRIEF, Fall 2008, at 26, 26; Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 50. The INS was one of the
twenty-two departments consolidated into DHS after the 9/11 attacks. See infra Part III.B.2 for a
description of the DHS’s biometrics program.
17
MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 4.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.; Harper, supra note 5, at 5.
21
MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 4; Harper, supra note 5, at 5.
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the TNC in case of an error. The worker has eight days to contest the
TNC.23 If the worker fails to or cannot challenge the TNC, then E-Verify
issues a final non-confirmation and the employer is required to either
terminate the worker or notify the DHS that it is employing a noncompliant
worker, subjecting the employer to criminal and civil penalties.24
Additionally, the E-Verify program obliges participating employers to
permit the SSA and DHS to make periodic “work site[]” visits and to
“make employment and E-Verify related records available” at the
Department’s request.25
B. The Move To Nationalize EEV
On June 9, 2008, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff remarked at the
State of Immigration Address that the “[o]ne critical tool for our success
[in curbing illegal immigration] is giving the employer the means to check
whether the applicant for a job is in fact presenting a valid social security
number and name that match what is in our government databases.”26 In
another speech on August 10, 2007, he outlined a plan to expand EEV and
its underlying policy in three key areas.27 First, DHS would designate EVerify as the EEV system in which all federal contractors and vendors
must participate.28 This expansion added a potential 200,000 companies to
the 52,000 who were using E-Verify at that time, bringing the total number
of American companies using the system to 3.5 percent.29 Second,
Secretary Chertoff announced DHS’s creation of a “no-match” regulation
increasing an employer’s liability if its workers’ names and SSNs do not
correspond to SSA records. The new policy would raise penalties by
twenty-five percent and expand criminal investigations into employers who
were charged with violating the DHS policy.30 Third, Secretary Chertoff
advocated integrating information in the national database utilized by E22

MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 4–5; Harper, supra note 5, at 5.
MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 5; Harper, supra note 5, at 5.
MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 5; Harper, supra note 5, at 5. Workers who receive
TNCs and fail to challenge them comprise almost eighty-five percent of TNC cases. MEISSNER &
ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 5. An employer is subjected to fines that range “from $500 to $1,000 for
each failure to notify the DHS. If the employer continues to employ the worker after [receiving] a final
nonconfirmation, there is a rebuttable presumption that the employer is knowingly employing an
unauthorized worker.” Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 51.
25
Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26
Michael Chertoff, Homeland Sec. Sec’y, & Carlos Gutierrez, Commerce Sec’y, State of
Immigration Address (June 9, 2008) [hereinafter Chertoff & Gutierrez, Immigration Address],
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1213101513448.shtm.
27
Michael Chertoff, Homeland Sec. Sec’y, & Carlos Gutierrez, Commerce Sec’y, Press
Conference on Border Security and Administrative Immigration Reforms (Aug. 10, 2007) [hereinafter
Chertoff & Gutierrez, Border Security], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/
pr_1186781502047.shtm.
28
Harper, supra note 5, at 6; Chertoff & Gutierrez, Border Security, supra note 27.
29
Harper, supra note 5, at 6.
30
Id.; Chertoff & Gutierrez, Border Security, supra note 27.
23
24
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Verify with other information databases. This would include access to
information from visas, passports, and state motor vehicle records, which
would “lay the ground work for further expansion.”32
Although Congress has yet to pass a law requiring all employers to use
E-Verify, recently several bills have been introduced in both the House and
Senate to nationalize some form of E-Verify. One legislator commented
on how there were currently eleven different proposals before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee suggesting reforms to E-Verify in preparation for
a national EEV program.33 In April 2009, Representative Gabrielle
Giffords of Arizona and Representative Sam Johnson of Texas introduced
House Resolution 2028, the New Employee Verification Act (NEVA),
which would extend the E-Verify program five more years and create a
new, more secure verification program in which employers could also
enroll.34 The new system, like E-Verify, would rely on the SSA and DHS
databases and include biometric information.35
In a hearing held in July 2009, Senator Charles Schumer endorsed
passing a bill that would create a “tough, fair, and effective employment
verification system,” and Representative Luis Gutierrez stated that an
“employment verification system must be part of [any] comprehensive
Senator Schumer outlined ten
immigration reform” package.36
characteristics, including requiring biometric information from prospective
workers, that he said were needed for a successful EEV system.37 Several
legislators also voiced their support for a national EEV program and
31

Chertoff & Gutierrez, Border Security, supra note 27.
Harper, supra note 5, at 6 (quoting the White House’s statement in a fact sheet released August
10, 2007). Note that the fact sheet Harper cites is now available through the DHS website at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1186757867585.shtm.
33
Electronic Employment Verification Systems: Needed Safeguards to Protect Privacy and
Prevent Misuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec.,
and Int’l Law of the H. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 6 (2008) [hereinafter Electronic Employment
Verification Systems] (statement of Rep. Conyers).
34
H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. §§ 101, 102 (2009); Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 61.
35
H.R. 2028 § 103(b)(2)(A); Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 61.
36
Ensuring a Legal Workforce: What Changes Should Be Made to Our Current Employment
Verification System?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Sec. of the
S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. 1–2, 10 (2009) [hereinafter Ensuring a Legal Workforce] (statements
of Sen. Schumer, Chairman, S. Judiciary Subcomm., and Rep. Gutierrez).
37
Id. at 2–4. The characteristics outlined by Senator Schumer are: (1) requiring employers to
check information against a federal immigration system; (2) using biometric identifiers to identify
prospective workers; (3) requiring employers to use the system on all prospective workers regardless of
immigration or citizenship status; (4) creating an inexpensive, easy-to-use, and quick program; (5)
exonerating employers who hire illegal workers because EEV returns false positives; (6) punishing
employers not using EEV when they hire illegal workers and employers using EEV when they
“knowingly hire illegal workers”; (7) funding the system with fees paid by non-citizens when they
obtain work permits and authorization; (8) ensuring significant and substantial protections built into
EEV to prevent workers from being erroneously denied work and allowing workers to work while
resolving TNCs; (9) requiring security checks when biometric information is collected and entered into
the system; and (10) safeguarding the privacy and civil liberties of workers and only allowing the
system to be used for employment verification purposes.
32
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reforms that could make such a system possible, including the addition of a
biometric element.38
The House Judiciary Committee held a similar hearing where
representatives also expressed support for nationalizing EEV. The
discussion centered around existing shortfalls in E-Verify and reforms
necessary to expand the program nationally.39 Representative Heath
Shuler of North Carolina advocated for phasing in a mandatory EEV
system within a four-year period.40 Representative Steven King of Iowa
suggested incorporating naturalization databases into the existing SSA and
DHS databases used by E-Verify.41
Legislation has also been proposed that would have required new-hires
to have a “REAL ID Act-compliant” card.42 The REAL ID Act, passed in
2005, imposes security, authentication, and issuance procedural standards
for state driver’s licenses and state ID cards.43 Most states, however, have
yet to comply with the Act. In April 2008, all fifty states had received or
applied for extensions beyond the May 11, 2008 deadline.44 By October of
2009, twenty-six states had adopted resolutions that declared their intent
not to comply with the program.45
Several states have passed legislation mandating that certain employers
participate in the E-Verify program. As of November 2010, Arizona,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Utah required all employers in those
38
Id. at 5, 7, 9. These include Senators John Cornyn, Jeff Sessions, and Representative Luis
Gutierrez, who was a witness at the Senate hearing.
39
Electronic Employment Verification Systems, supra note 33, at 1.
40
Id. at 33.
41
Id. at 54.
42
S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007). Called the “Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007,”
the bill was eventually defeated when it failed to garner the sixty votes necessary to move it from
debate to passage. Michael Sandler & Jonathan Allen, Senate Gives Up on Immigration Bill, CONG. Q.
TODAY, June 7, 2007.
43
Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 202, 119 Stat. 231, 312–15 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Mimi Hall, States Get ‘Real ID’ Extensions, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 2008,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-04-02-realid_N.htm.
44
Real ID Act § 202(a)(1) (providing that the requirements will go into effect three years from the
May 11, 2005 date of enactment); Hall, supra note 43 (stating that DHS granted all 50 states
extensions).
45
See
Anti-Real
ID
Legislation
in
the
States,
REALNIGHTMARE.ORG,
http://www.realnightmare.org/news/105/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) (displaying states who passed
legislation prohibiting REAL ID or resolutions denouncing REAL ID); see also Jaikumar Vijayan,
Obama Will Inherit a Real Mess on REAL ID: The Effort To Impose National Standards for Photo IDs
Remains a Bone of Contention Between Federal and State Officials, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 22, 2008,
available at http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/331497/Obama_Will_Inherit_A_Real_Mess
_On_Real_ID (discussing Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano’s signing of an Arizona bill barring the
state from participating in the program). Napolitano, a strong opponent of the REAL ID program, was
appointed as head of DHS when President Obama took office, placing the future of the Act in uncertain
waters. Id. But see Dennis Myers, REAL ID Is Coming: As Obama and Congress Slow a Federal
Driver License to a Crawl, Gibbons and DMV Race Ahead, NEWSREVIEW.COM (Feb. 11, 2010),
http://www.newsreview.com/reno/content?oid=1369527 (reporting on the Nevada Governor’s push for
REAL ID).
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states to enroll in E-Verify.
Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, and Nebraska
currently require that all state offices and all or most state contractors
participate in the program, while Minnesota and Rhode Island have
extended the mandate to only their executive branches and state
contractors.47 North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia have also passed
legislation that requires state offices to use E-Verify.48 Tennessee provides
incentives for private employers who voluntarily use the program and
immunizes employers enrolled in the E-Verify program from state
46
See Legal Arizona Workers Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214(A) (Supp. 2009) (“[E]very
employer . . . shall verify the employment eligibility of the employee through the e-verify
program.”); Mississippi Employment Protection Act, MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-11-3(4)(b)(i) (2010)
(“Every employer shall register with and utilize the status verification system to verify the federal
employment authorization status of all newly hired employees.”); South Carolina Illegal Immigration
Reform Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-14-20(A) (Supp. 2009) (“[E]very public employer shall register and
participate in the federal work authorization program to verify the employment authorization of all new
employees.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-47-201(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (“A private employer who
employs 15 or more employees . . . may not hire a new employee . . . unless the private employer . . .
uses the status verification system to verify the federal legal working status of the new
employee . . . .”).
47
See Georgia Security and Immigration Compliance Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 13-10-91(a)–(b)
(West Supp. 2009) (“Every public employer . . . shall register and participate in the federal work
authorization program to verify employment eligibility of all newly hired employees. . . . No public
employer shall [contract] for the physical performance of services . . . unless the contractor . . .
participates in the federal work authorization program . . . .”); Idaho Exec. Order No. 2006–40 (May
29, 2009), available at http://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/execorders/eo09/eo_2009_10.html (“The
Division of Human Resources shall . . . verify and ensure that all new employees with any agency of
the State of Idaho are eligible for employment under federal and state law. . . . [A]ll contractors and
subcontractors [must] declare to the contracting state agency that they have substantiated that all
employees providing services”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 285.530.2 (West Supp. 2010) (“As a condition for
the award of any contract or grant in excess of five thousand dollars . . . the business entity shall . . .
affirm its enrollment and participation in a federal work authorization program with respect to the
employees working in connection with the contracted services.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 4-114(2) (Supp.
2009) (“Every public employer and public contractor shall register with and use a federal immigration
verification system to determine the work eligibility status of new employees physically performing
services within the State of Nebraska.”); Minn. Exec. Order No. 08-01 (Jan. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.governor.state.mn.us/mediacenter/pressreleases/printerfriendly/PROD008598.html
(“Requiring all hiring authorities within the executive branch of state government to use the federal
electronic work verification program (‘E-Verify’).”; R.I. Exec. Order No. 08-01, available at
http://www.governor.ri.gov/documents/executiveorders/2008/01_illegal_immigration_control_
order.pdf (“The Deparment of Administration shall register and use the federal government’s E-Verify
program . . . [and] shall require that all persons and business . . . doing business with the state of Rhode
Island also register with . . . the E-Verify Program.”).
48
N.C. GEN. STAT § 126-7.1(f) (2010) (“Each State agency, department, institution, university,
community college, and local education agency shall verify, in accordance with the Basic Pilot
Program administered by the United States Department of Homeland Security . . . .”); The Oklahoma
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1313.A (West 2007) (“Every
public employer shall register with and utilize a Status Verification System . . . .”); VA. CODE ANN §
40.1–11.2 (Supp. 2010) (“All agencies of the Commonwealth shall be enrolled in the E-Verify program
by December 1, 2012 . . . .”). A U.S. District Court has delayed enforcement of the law in Oklahoma
by granting a preliminary injunction against it and, therefore, it is not in effect. Chamber of Commerce
of the U.S. v. Henry, No. CIV-08-109-C, 2008 WL 2329164, at *8 (W.D. Okla. June 4, 2008). In
February 2010, the Tenth Circuit, reversing in part and affirming in part the District Court’s decision,
upheld the injunction. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 742 F.3d 742, 771 (10th Cir.
2010).
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sanctions.
Likewise, Arkansas, Indiana, Ohio, Rhode Island, and
Wyoming have introduced legislation that would mandate EEV
participation for some or all of the employers in their state.50 A number of
local governments have also initiated some mandatory EEV requirements
in the absence of federal law. For example, the city of Mission Viejo,
California requires employers that have contracts with the city to confirm
worker eligibility through E-Verify.51 Columbia County, Oregon also
passed an ordinance requiring all county employers to use E-Verify.52
Only one state has reacted adversely to the voluntary program. The
Illinois legislature passed a statute that banned employers from using EVerify until SSA and DHS could provide a response within three days in
ninety-nine percent of the cases that receive a TNC. In March 2009,
however, a U.S. District Court struck down the Illinois provision, allowing
employers to enroll voluntarily in the program or to opt-out.53
C. Assessing the Current State of E-Verify
E-Verify offers some advantages against legal liability to employers
and workers who voluntarily participate in the program. First, when an
employer hires a worker authorized by the system, the employer is
presumed to have not knowingly hired an undocumented worker should an
action be brought against that employer.54 This is particularly important as
DHS worksite raids are unlikely to cease during the Obama
administration.55 There is also a special benefit for U.S. college graduates
who are foreign nationals and who would like to extend their stays in the
United States: employers who participate in E-Verify may extend the
former student’s “Optional Practical Training” work permit for an
additional seventeen months.56 Several states have also extended benefits
to employers who participate in the program, offering state contracts
exclusively to those employers or immunizing them from legal liability.57
During the program’s thirteen-year stint, many enhancements and
corrections have been made, offering a systematic stability that could work
49
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-103(d) (2008) (“A person has not violated subsection (b) . . . if the
person verified the immigrant status of the person . . . by using the federal electronic work
authorization verification service provided by the United States department of homeland
security . . . .”).
50
Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 53
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
United States v. Illinois, No. 07-3261, 2009 WL 662703, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2009).
54
Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 51.
55
Dawn Lurie, Employers Beware: DHS’s Shifting Priorities in Immigration Worksite
Enforcement, SECURITY DEBRIEF (June 10, 2009), http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/2009/06/10/
employers-beware-dhss-shifting-priorities-in-immigration-worksite-enforcement/.
56
Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 51.
57
See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text for a discussion on various state requirements
and incentives for using E-Verify.
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58

on a national level. Jonathan Scharfen, Acting Director of the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), testified to the
House Judiciary Subcommittee that the government has made significant
improvements to E-Verify, which have decreased mismatches and other
mistakes in the databases, enhanced user ability, reduced typographical
errors, protected data privacy, and deterred document fraud.59 USCIS
plans to integrate passport and visa data into the program, to strengthen the
system’s accuracy.60 Also, because many employers and government users
are familiar with E-Verify, a national implementation may cost less than
creating a new one from the ground up.
E-Verify does, however, exhibit problems and place burdens on
various entities, which would be exacerbated if the number of users
increased exponentially, should Congress require all employers to
participate. First, the program places significant burdens on the employer.
Each participant must obtain photocopies of a new employee’s
Employment Authorization Card or Permanent Residence Card issued by
DHS, which is ordinarily not required by federal law.61 For small business
owners—who lack photocopying resources—such a requirement creates
time and monetary costs. Large companies may also be burdened by the
initial implementation cost, as hiring processes would need to be
restructured, new documents would need to be created, and employee
training would be necessary.62 Participation in the program exposes
employers to SSA or DHS worksite visits that can disrupt business
operations and further expose a business to other civil or criminal
58
Many legislators have also lauded the benefits of E-Verify in comparison to other national
verification programs. For example, Representative King said the system provides “a fast and easy
method” to verify a prospective worker’s employability, which he claimed was evidenced by the 1,000
employers who have signed up weekly to participate in the voluntary program. Electronic Employment
Verification Systems, supra note 33, at 3–4. Representative Lamar Smith of Texas reported that
employers using E-Verify did not feel overburdened and were generally satisfied with the system’s
performance. Id. at 5. He added that the program rejected less than one percent of persons eligible to
work and accepted over ninety-seven percent of workers born outside the United States. Id.
59
Id. at 46–47; MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE BASICS OF E-VERIFY, THE
US EMPLOYER VERIFICATION SYSTEM (2009), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/
display.cfm?ID=726. In the last six years, several improvements have been made to E-Verify: (1) in
2005, E-Verify switched from a phone-based system to an internet-based one making data and usability
easier; (2) in 2008, DHS improved the communication links among its databases allowing real-time
updates of new immigrants’ information; (3) in 2007, a photo-screening tool was added to limit identity
fraud; and (4) in 2008, DHS allowed for DHS database confirmations, even when SSA databases had
not been updated to reflect a new citizen’s changed status. Id.
60
Electronic Employment Verification Systems, supra note 33, at 46 (statement of John Scharfen,
Acting Director, USCIS).
61
Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 51.
62
Asaad & Wesley, supra note 16, at 27. The American Council on International Personnel
stated that significant implementation costs could be expected for large and complex organizations.
These include performing legal reviews, altering the process for hiring workers, developing protocols
for resolving TNC and final nonconfirmations, and training staff. Id. One company reported that it
cost $40,000 annually to outsource E-Verify services. Id.
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penalties.
Enrollment itself does not immunize an employer from
penalties, and many employers may falsely believe that once they enact the
system there is no need to continue to heed existing immigration laws. As
a national E-Verify system has not been tested, screening problems may
create chaos for the participating employer, SSA, and DHS offices.
Second, the mandate also places burdens on the federal government
and taxpayers. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found
that mandating E-Verify participation would “substantially increase” the
demands on DHS and SSA resources.64 A mandated program could cost
DHS over $400 million annually and add 3.6 million additional visits or
phone calls to SSA field offices.65 As things stand, many of the TNCinitiated investigations are false positives, yielding few final nonconformations.66 Most TNC-generated inquiries stem from changes in
citizenship status or in names that have not been updated in the SSA
database.67 Assuming nationwide enrollment, the current one percent error
rate would affect 600,000 workers per year.68 That error rate would also
likely increase as a mandatory system would increase enrollment, placing
greater strain on the system’s infrastructure. Staffing universal enrollment
could also create new and unforeseeable types of errors.69
Aside from negative effects on employers and government resources,
E-Verify also places burdens on the prospective workers, who are screened
when applying for jobs. Many foreign-born applicants are particularly
vulnerable to misspellings and incorrect name order in the SSA and DHS
databases.70 This type of error usually leads to a TNC, which initially
prevents the worker from securing employment.71 Further, E-Verify
requires the employer to inform the worker of the TNC.72 Should an
employer fail to notify the worker, the worker may miss her opportunity to
63
A DHS raid on six Swift & Co. (now JBS Swift & Co.) meat processing plants, for example,
cost the company 1,200 workers and fifty-three million dollars, despite the fact that the company had
used E-Verify for many years. Id. at 26.
64
Romero, supra note 12, at 612. Despite the fact that some companies do everything
permissible to ascertain the immigration status of all workers through E-Verify and still enjoy some
legal benefits from participation, they are not immune to the economic impacts of raids when they
unknowingly hire illegal workers.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 613. Other errors can occur as a result of employer mistakes and “[r]oot errors” in the
database, which are underlying mistakes in the SSA and DHS databases. MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM,
supra note 3, at 8 n.26.
67
Romero, supra note 12, at 613.
68
MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 8.
69
Id. at 8 n.27 (stating that the GAO estimates that verification of all new hires would require EVerify to process sixty-three million queries per year).
70
Because many names have multiple spellings, some cultures use different name orders, and
some languages require transliteration from non-Latin alphabets, foreign-born citizens are more likely
to face such errors. Id. at 6.
71
See id. at 5–6 (stating that “errors may prevent US citizens and other legal workers from
initially–or occasionally ever–being confirmed”).
72
Id. at 5.
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contest the TNC and then lose her job. The program also burdens the
worker with the responsibility of contesting the TNC.73 This responsibility
disadvantages the worker, who may have to miss important training or take
unpaid time off to contact the USCIS or SSA to correct the error.74 The
TNC may also go unresolved if the prospective worker is unfamiliar with
the resolution process. These problems disproportionately affect legal
immigrants, foreign-born citizens, and other minorities.75
As many in Congress have noted, the current E-Verify system also
suffers from inherent vulnerabilities that undocumented workers can easily
exploit. For example, although the system can determine whether a SSN
provided by a prospective worker is valid, it cannot determine whether that
SSN actually belongs to that worker.76 E-Verify, therefore, lacks the
ability to ensure that the worker presenting the SSN is the actual person to
whom the information belongs.77
Other E-Verify shortcomings stem from its reliance on employer
enforcement. The participating employer is required to collect and
examine all worker documents at the time of hire.78 The employer must
attest under penalty of perjury that it has made a good faith examination of
the worker’s documents, that it found them to be genuine, and that the
worker appears to be eligible to work.79 Employers, however, often fail to
accurately do this, because at the opening of the employment relationship,
the employer has little incentive to examine a prospective worker’s
identity.80 The “identification-by-card process” also contains many
weaknesses that either party might exploit.81 Along the same lines, the
system is vulnerable to identity fraud initiated by the employer, because
the employer stands as a first-line enforcer of E-Verify’s policies with

73

See id. (explaining that “[w]orkers have eight business days to contact the appropriate federal
agency and initiate a challenge to the TNC, which generally requires calling [USCIS] or visiting an
SSA field office”).
74
Id. at 6.
75
See id. at 6 n.19 (stating that “[t]he known error rate (i.e., corrected TNCs) in 2006–2007 was
30 times higher for foreign-born than native-born workers, and 98 times higher for naturalized US
citizens than for native-born citizens”).
76
Asaad & Wesley, supra note 16, at 27. Many workers who were caught in a DHS raid at
Howard Industries had illegally obtained and used valid Social Security numbers. Id.
77
As Michael Aytes, Acting Director of the USCIS, noted, the system was not designed to detect
identity theft, but that recently a photo screening tool was added to “combat document and identity
fraud.” Ensuring a Legal Workforce, supra note 36, at 13.
78
MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 9.
79
Harper, supra note 5, at 11.
80
See id. (explaining that the initial interaction between an employer and prospective worker is
not like ongoing personal relationships, and that the prospective worker of a low-skill job “proffers his
or her identity for the first time”).
81
See, e.g., id. at 11–13 fig.1 (describing “the three steps by which a card transfers identity
information from the ID subject (the cardholder) to the ID verifier (or relying party)” and their
vulnerabilities).
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little, if any, government oversight.
E-Verify cannot prevent the
employer from hiring a worker “under the table” when she has knowledge
of an undocumented applicant but needs the worker’s services.83
D. House Resolution 2028
In June 2008, the House Judiciary Subcommittee held a public hearing
consisting of three panels to address the need for an EEV system that
would protect worker privacy and prevent employer misuse.84 At the time
of the hearing, there were eleven bills pending before the Judiciary
Committee, each proposing a nationally mandated EEV system.85 One bill,
introduced by Representative Gabrielle Giffords of Arizona, included the
option for a worker to “lock” her identity after submitting her SSN to an
employer for verification.86 Another proposal incorporated a photographscreening tool that would compare the photos of passports on record with
photos presented by the worker.87 But the most promising solution
presented to combat identify fraud was House Bill 2028 (“NEVA”), a
bipartisan bill that would incorporate biometric identification information
such as fingerprint images or retinal scans of the prospective worker into
E-Verify.88
NEVA extends E-Verify for another five years.89 The bill requires
employers who must participate, or who are voluntarily participating, in a
verification program, to use either E-Verify or the Secure Employment
Eligibility Verification System (“SEEVS”), an automated employment
verification system established by NEVA.90 Like E-Verify, SEEVS
requires employers to check information provided by the prospective
worker with data housed by the SSA and DHS.91 But the new program
calls for the protection of authenticated information through the use of

82
MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 10 (“Inaccurate verification allows bad-faith
employers and unauthorized workers to go through the motions of compliance . . . while still violating
the law. . . .”).
83
Id.
84
Electronic Employment Verification Systems, supra note 33, at 1.
85
The hearing was the third in a series of hearings addressing immigration reform, the problems
with the “current paper-based system” and the proposals to improve EEV. Id.
86
Id. at 36–37. The proposal would also create private-sector, government-certified companies to
authenticate the identities of new employees through background checks and document screening tools.
Id. at 37.
87
Id. at 46 (statement of Jonathan Scharfen, Acting Director, USCIS).
88
H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. § 103(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2009). The bill was introduced on April 22, 2009.
On May 26, 2009, it was referred to the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees,
Border Security, and International Law where it currently remains. H.R. 2028: New Employee
Verification Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2028
(last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
89
H.R. 2028 § 101(1).
90
Id. § 102(c)(1)(E).
91
Id. § 103(b)(2)(A)(i).
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biometric technology, a service to be provided by private third parties.92
Employers who participate in SEEVS and follow required procedures, like
those who participate in E-Verify, enjoy a presumption that the employer
has not violated NEVA should DHS discover illegal workers.93
The bill also provides privacy protection for biometric data collected
for SEEVS. First, it requires that stored biometric information be
encrypted and segregated from other identifying information.94 Second, it
allows biometric data to be maintained and linked to identifying
information of the new worker only if she consents.95 Additionally, the bill
requires that the worker’s identifying and biometric information be
removed from the system should she choose to cancel enrollment.96
III. SURVEYING BIOMETRICS
A. Biometric Technologies
Although the term may seem obscure, biometrics is nothing more than
the measurement or analysis of unique physical or behavioral
characteristics generally as a means to verify personal identity.97 Prior to
the 9/11 attacks, the use of biometric technologies had been increasing.
Government agencies had already required the use of biometrics to control
access to secure areas, and private companies had started using them to
facilitate retail payment plans.98 Of the many possible biometric
technologies, eight were developed, tested, and placed in the public and
private sectors.99 But despite their presence, many people had little
experience working with biometrics and the media had “virtually no
knowledge” of biometric technology issues.100
The events of September 11, 2001 “led to an increase in calls for the
use of biometrics.”101 Over the following years, biometrics evolved from a
novel technology with limited application to a ubiquitous tool with a wide
92

Id. § 103(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Id. § 102(d)(3).
94
Id. § 103(b)(2)(D)(i).
95
Id. § 103(b)(2)(D)(ii).
96
Id. § 103(b)(4)(C).
97
Biometrics Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/biometrics (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
98
WILLIAM SLOAN COATS ET AL., THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO BIOMETRICS 1 (William Sloan
Coats ed., 2007).
99
JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS: IDENTIFYING AND
ADDRESSING SOCIOCULTURAL CONCERNS xv (2001) [hereinafter WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY
BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS]. Those eight include fingerprint, hand and finger geometry, facial
recognition, voice recognition, iris scans, retinal scans, dynamic signature verification, and keystroke
dynamics technology. Id.
100
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11: ADVANCING
SCIENCE, ENHANCING OPERATIONS 7 (2008).
101
COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 1.
93
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variety of applications across a broad range of industries.
In a post-9/11
world, biometrics has mainly served as a purported failsafe security device
used by governments in border patrol management, law enforcement, and
counterterrorism.103 The federal government has focused biometric
research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts on four
key areas: facial recognition, fingerprint identification, retinal
identification, and multimodal biometric identification.104 Multiple federal
agencies “collaboratively planned, funded, and managed” these research
activities, enabling the federal government to establish new, and to
enhance existing, biometric technologies to improve U.S. security.105
1. Facial Recognition
Facial recognition is the automated process of recording the
geometrically distinct features of the face, which are stored in a database,
and then comparing them with samples for authentication.106 An
advantage of facial recognition is that “it can be easily confirmed by a
system operator, such as a guard, by comparing a picture in [the] database”
with an individual’s facial features.107 It is also “less intrusive” than any
other biometric technology.108
Facial recognition systems represent about ten percent of the
biometrics technology market share.109 As the technology became more
commercialized, the federal government began a series of evaluations for
facial recognition systems.110
Since 2000, there have been three
evaluations, which have consecutively increased in size, difficulty, and
complexity.111 These evaluations provided a snapshot of facial recognition
102

Examine the Global Biometric Forecast to 2012, MARKETWIRE (Oct. 20, 2008 1:51 PM),
http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/Examine-the-Global-Biometric-Forecast-to-2012911606.htm. One market research report estimates that the compound annual growth rate of biometric
technologies will exceed twenty percent through 2012. Id.
103
COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 10–11.
104
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 13. Although NEVA does not require
specific biometrics technologies, for the purpose of this Note I will only discuss the four technologies
on which the federal government has increased RDT&E efforts. NEVA requires that the SEEVS “shall
utilize the services of private sector entities,” or enrollment providers, for “protection of the
authenticated information [of a prospective worker] through [the use of] biometric technology.” H.R.
2028, 111th Cong. § 103(b)(2)(A) (2009). Congress would likely evaluate potential biometric
technology companies through a bidding process or by establishing a committee to evaluate existing
biometric technologies and then requiring prospective vendors to provide a specific biometric
technology or combination thereof.
105
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 12.
106
WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 16.
107
COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 4.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 13.
111
For more information on all three tests and their results, see FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR
TEST, http://www.frvt.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) (describing the 2006 results of the Face
Recognition Vendor Test results and providing links to the results of previous years).
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capabilities and proved that some systems were comparable to, or better
than, humans at facial recognition.112 One of the most notable uses of
facial recognition technology was at the 2001 Super Bowl in Tampa Bay.
As attendees entered the stadium, the Tampa Bay Police Department used
facial recognition technology to scan faces and compare them with face
images in the police department’s database.113
Of course, facial recognition technology is not without flaws.
Environmental factors, such as lighting and the level of user cooperation,
can adversely affect a system’s performance.114 Likewise, a user could
fool a scanner by significantly altering her facial appearance.115 Even
under the best conditions, the performance of facial recognition systems is
not high enough to a reasonable degree of reliability without severely
constraining the system.116 To address these and other concerns, the
government sponsored two initiatives: the Facial Recognition Grand
Challenge in 2004 and the Face Recognition Advanced Study Workshop in
2005. 117
2. Fingerprint Identification and Verification
Fingerprint biometrics is one of the least intrusive and best known
biometrics technologies.118 It is an automated digital version of the older
ink-and-paper method used by law enforcement agents.119 A user scans her
fingerprints to be read and checked against previously recorded copies.120
Fingerprint technology represents almost half of the biometric technology
market share.121
112
P. JONATHON PHILLIPS ET AL., NAT’L INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRVT 2006 AND
ICE 27 2006 LARGE-SCALE RESULTS 27 (2007) (“The ability of algorithms to recognize faces across
illumination changes has made significant progress.”).
113
Jessica Reaves, Tampa Gets Ready for Its Closeup, TIME, July 16, 2001, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,167846,00.html.
114
WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 16; see also Ellen
Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics; $1 Billion Project to Include Images of Irises
and Faces, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2007, at A1 (reporting that a German study found that current facial
recognition technique had a sixty percent success rate during daylight but only a ten to twenty percent
rate at night).
115
John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns—Drafting
the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 106 (1997) [hereinafter Woodward, Biometric
Scanning].
116
RUUD BOLLE ET AL., GUIDE TO BIOMETRICS 40 (2004).
117
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 14; see also P. JONATHON PHILLIPS ET AL.,
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRGC, OVERVIEW OF THE FACE RECOGNITION GRAND
CHALLENGE 1 (2005) (describing the FRGC’s goal to “achieve [an] increase in performance by
pursuing development of algorithms” for the improvement of facial recognition technology). The
FRASW was a two-day invitation-only workshop, where fifty-five participants were sequestered in
intensive technical deliberations.
FACE RECOGNITION ADVANCED STUDY RESEARCH,
http://www.wvu.edu/~facerecognition/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
118
COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 4.
119
WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRICS APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 16.
120
Id.
121
COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 4.

2010]

BIOMETRICS IN THE HIRING PROCESS

691

Capturing a fingerprint can be difficult because some people cannot
generate clean fingerprint images and accuracy decreases with the user’s
age.122 The quality of the fingerprint image captured is critical because the
scanning devices use a complex set of algorithms to match captured
fingerprints with stored fingerprint data.123 All of the current four
“livescan” fingerprint acquisition technologies available have some
difficulty retrieving and storing digital fingerprints.124
Since the 9/11 attacks, the federal government has increased its efforts
to advance and evaluate fingerprint recognition technology.125 Through
tests conducted in 2003 and 2004,126 the government assessed the accuracy
of algorithms used by fingerprint systems to measure and compare
fingerprints and to evaluate which systems performed consistently.127 The
government has also worked to make capture devices faster and smaller.128
Generally, a fingerprint biometrics program is employed for three reasons:
law enforcement, fraud prevention, and access control.129

122

Id.
BOLLE ET AL., supra note 116, at 34 (describing the different matching approaches used by
fingerprint authentication systems).
124
Id. at 32–35. There are currently four common methods used to capture digital fingerprints
and each presents its own challenge. First, optical methods capturing a reflected signal from the
underside of a prism as the subject touches the top have trouble capturing images when fingertips are
too wet or too dry. Second, CMOS capacitance converts different charge accumulations from the
ridges and valleys of fingerprints into pixels. On the other hand, the capturing device is sensitive to
scratching, electrostatic discharge, and mechanical failure. Third, thermal scanning measures
temperature changes from the ridge-valley structure when a fingertip is swiped across a thermal
scanner. Although less susceptible to wetness or dryness and static discharge, the copied images are
not rich in value or range. Fourth, ultrasound sensing uses an ultrasonic beam scanned across the
finger’s surface, measuring the depth of the valleys from the reflected signal. Moisture and oils do not
affect the sensitivity of these sensors, but they are very bulky and require longer scanning times than
the other technology. Id. at 3.
125
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 13, 15.
126
The government began the Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluation in 2003, testing
segmentation fingerprint matching systems that measure a user’s individual prints, requiring the system
to separately capture a user’s prints on each finger. Those tests revealed that top-performing systems
performed consistently well over a variety of image types and data sources and confirmed the degree
that additional fingers improve system accuracy. The system also revealed the degradation of accuracy
caused by the collection of poor-quality prints. The government conducted a second series of
evaluations in 2004, called the Slap Fingerprint Segmentation Evaluations. Slap Fingerprint analysis
differs from segmentation fingerprints because the user must simultaneously press her four fingers of
one hand onto a scanner or fingerprint card and the system captures the impressions of the four fingers.
BRADFORD ULERY ET AL., SLAP FINGERPRINT SEGMENTATION EVALUATION 2004 ANALYSIS REPORT,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2005); CHARLES WILSON ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
FINGERPRINT VENDOR TECH. EVALUATION 2003: SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND ANALYSIS REPORT 2–3
(2004).
127
WILSON ET AL., supra note 126, at 3.
128
NAT’L SCI & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 16 (describing the government’s attempt to
advance rolled-equivalent and slap devices in 2004 through the Fast Capture Rolled-Equivalent
Finger/Palm Print Initiative).
129
WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 16.
123
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3. Iris Recognition
The colored part of the eye surrounding the pupil, called the iris, is
extremely rich in texture.130 Iris recognition systems measure the pattern in
the colored part of the eye, although the scan does not capture or measure
the color.131 The iris contains distributed immutable patterns, which form
randomly.132 No two irises are the same: the pattern in one’s left eye is
even different from the pattern in one’s right eye.133 Moreover, these
patterns, like fingerprints, do not change over time.134 Iris scanning
devices account for almost ten percent of the biometric technology market
share.135
While iris scanning can be highly accurate, it requires a high degree of
cooperation—and patience—from the user.136 Most commercial iris
scanning systems “require the user to position his or her eyes within the
field of view of a single narrow-angled camera.”137 Designing an iris
capture device that is “convenient and unobtrusive” is a challenge.138 The
device needs to be sensitive enough to account not only for variations in
ambient lighting from one situation to the next, but also for reflections of
light from the eyeball, glasses, and contact lenses.139 Thus, iris-scanning
devices are one of the most expensive types of biometric technology.140
To improve the utility, performance, and ease-of-use of iris scanning,
the federal government substantially increased its investments in the
technology after the 9/11 attacks.141 These investments have led to “irison-the-move” and “iris-at-a-distance” recognition systems.142 In 2004,
130

BOLLE ET AL., supra note 116, at 43.
WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 17.
Id.
133
Id. These patterns, like fingerprints, are the results of the developmental process, not genetics.
BOLLE ET AL., supra note 116, at 43. The iris has proven to be a good biometric identifier with high
discriminating properties. Id.
134
Woodward, Biometric Scanning, supra note 115, at 103–04.
135
COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 4.
136
Ravi Das, Retinal Recognition: Biometric Technology in Practice, 22 KEESING J. DOCUMENTS
& IDENTITY 11, 14 (2007).
137
BOLLE ET AL., supra note 116, at 44.
138
Id.
139
See id. (explaining that hard contacts create the biggest problem with reflected light pollution).
140
COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 4.
141
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 17; see also Ron Vetter, Editorial,
Authentication by Biometric Verification, 43 COMPUTER, Feb. 2010, at 28, 28 (stating that “[i]n the past
few years, government initiatives have spurred the growth of biometrics, and overall activities in
biometric research have accelerated tremendously,” and that “[t]his growth is due not only to increased
interest in security concerns after 9/11, but also in response to privacy concerns regarding the
confidential use of personal information being stored and transmitted across the Internet”).
142
Arun Ross, Iris Recognition: The Path Forward, 43 COMPUTER, Feb. 2010, at 30, 34. Other
improvements have included increased standoff distances for accurate measurements, increased system
performance (while also reducing size and cost), and the development of prototypes capable of
acquiring and matching the iris of users while moving through a portal. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL,
supra note 100, at 17–18.
131
132

2010]

BIOMETRICS IN THE HIRING PROCESS

693

John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City installed an irisscanning system for employees to access secure areas of the airport.143
4. Multimodal Biometric Identification
The previously-discussed biometric systems are unimodal systems,
meaning they rely on evidence from a single source of information for
authentication.144 Multimodal biometric identification systems rely on
multiple sources of information to establish identity.145 The systems can
fuse matching information between biometric data entered by the user and
biometric data saved on databases.146 Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the federal
government had “begun efforts to develop automated, multimodal systems
Biometric technology
for identifying people at a distance.”147
combinations explored included “facial recognition, iris recognition,
Doppler radar, infrared imagery, pulse and heartbeat recognition, and gait
recognition.”148 By the end of 2003, some biometric systems were capable
of recognizing users at up to 150 feet.149
5. Other Feasible Biometric Options
Although the federal government has invested significant research and
development into four biometric technologies since the 9/11 attacks, recent
developments may prompt Congress to consider other biometric
technologies. Infrared vein scanning captures images of blood vessels in
the back of the hand with infrared light and stores the picture on a
template.150 While the technology originally required scans of the entire
hand or palm, Hitachi has developed a system that uses infrared LEDs and
a CCD (charged couple device) camera to scan and capture vein patterns in
the middle section of a finger, which it compares to a database associated
with the application assigned to the finger.151 One author notes that “92%
143

Robin Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric Technology, 25
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653, 661 (2003); Ina Paiva Cordle, Airports Focus on Limiting Workers’
Access, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14, 2004, at E1.
144
These systems typically suffer from five problems because of their reliance on one type of
data: (1) noise in sensed data—a scar on a finger or cold air affecting a voice or noise interference
emanating from faulty scanning sensors; (2) intra-class variation—variations because the user is
incorrectly interacting with a sensor or because the sensor is modified during the authentication; (3)
inter-class similarities—the larger the pool of user information in a database, the more likely that
multiple users will have features that overlap; (4) non-universality—the inability of biometric systems
to pick up meaningful biometric data from poorly defined features; and (5): spoof attacks—fraudulent
data or behavior by users. Arun Ross & Anil K. Jain, Multimodal Biometrics: An Overview, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH EUROPEAN SIGNAL PROCESSING CONFERENCE 1221, 1221 (2004).
145
Id.
146
Id. at 1221–22.
147
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 18.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Woodward, Biometric Scanning, supra note 115, at 108.
151
Kathy Kincade, Vein Scanning Improves Door, Car, and Computer Security, 44 LASER FOCUS
WORLD, May 2008, at 17, 21.
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of the financial institutions in Japan have adopted finger-vein biometric
devices in their ATMs,”152 demonstrating that the technology is a practical
and affordable solution.
B. Current Biometric Operational Activities by the U.S. Government
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the federal government used two major
biometric systems: the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS) and INS’s Automated Biometric Integrated
System.153 Today, biometrics have permeated the operational activities of
the Department of Defense (DOD), DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and the State Department.
1. Department of Defense
After September 11, 2001, the DOD created a biometric collection and
storage system compatible with IAFIS to lock down the identity of known
Known as the Automated Biometrics
or suspected terrorists.154
Identification System (ABIS) and managed by the Biometrics Task Force
(BTF),155 the database consists of biometric information from individuals
captured in Iraqi and Afghani war zones.156 The resulting collaboration
between the DOD and the FBI led to the discovery that many war
criminals had prior criminal records in the United States.157 Similar to
SEEVS, the DOD used the biometric information to screen Iraqi personnel
applying for selection into the Iraqi Police Academy. This system
prevented known terrorists and insurgents from serving on the police force,
ultimately leading to their recapture.158 To date, the DOD uses facial
recognition, fingerprints, iris recognition, and palm imaging data.159

152

Id. at 24.
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 23.
154
Ellen Nakashima, Post-9/11 Dragnet Turns Up Surprises; Biometrics Link Foreign Detainees
to Arrests in U.S., WASH. POST, July 6, 2008, at A01.
155
BTF was created in 2006 as a result of a DOD reorganization that consolidated the Biometrics
Management Office (BMO), which managed and regulated the Department’s biometric technologies,
and the Biometrics Fusion Center (BFC), which was responsible for evaluating and procuring
biometrics technologies that were compatible with the Department’s information systems. See DoD
Biometrics Reorganization Takes Shape, 2 BIOMETRIC BULL., Mar.–Apr. 2006,
http://www.biometrics.dod.mil/Newsletter/issues/2006/March/v2issue2_a1.htm
(discussing
the
consolidation of the BMO and the BFC into the BTF); see also BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, ANNUAL
REPORT FY07 6 (2007), available at www.biometrics.dod.mil/Files/Documents/AnnualReports/
fy07.pdf (discussing the creation of ABIS and ABIS’s purpose).
156
See Nakashima, supra note 154 (detailing the use of ABIS for maintaining records on Iraqi and
Afgahni detainees).
157
Id.
158
See BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, supra note 155, at 7 (noting that the system revealed that some
applicants to the Iraqi Police Academy had records as terrorists or insurgents).
159
Biometrics History Timeline, BIOMETRICS IDENTITY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.biometrics.
dod.mil/References/Biometrics_Timeline.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
153
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2. Department of Homeland Security
DHS, created after the 9/11 attacks, has statutory and regulatory
mandates to incorporate biometrics.160 Because DHS’s main function is to
keep terrorists out of the United States, as well as to welcome international
travelers into U.S. ports on a daily basis, DHS “incorporate[s] biometrics
into identity documents for the purpose of freezing identity, searching
waitlists, conducting criminal background checks, reducing fraud,
improving border and transportation security, and granting benefits and
credentialing.”161 DHS also provides biometric identification and analysis
services to immigration and border management agencies, law
enforcement departments, and intelligence communities to aid in the
assessment of an individual’s risk to the United States.162 The vast
majority of the data collected is in the form of digital fingerprints and
DHS also manages the Transportation Worker
photographs.163
Identification Credentials (TWIC) program, which uses biometrics to
screen and verify the identities of transportation workers, who are allowed
access to the most sensitive parts of the nation’s transportation
infrastructure.164 Congress established the TWIC through the Marine
Transportation Security Act, which requires the Transportation Security
Administration to collect a transportation worker’s ten fingerprints,
biographical information, photograph, employer information, and other
appropriate information in exchange for access to secure areas of port
facilities.165
3. Department of Justice
Prior to September 11, 2001, the DOJ, through the FBI, maintained
IAFIS, which, at the time of its creation was “the largest and most
advanced biometric database in the world”; IAFIS held fingerprint data
information linked to criminal histories from all fifty states and the U.S.

160
See, e.g., Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173,
§ 303, 116 Stat. 543, 554 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1732 (2006)) (requiring that each country participating
in a visa waiver program “shall certify . . . that it has a program to issue to its nationals machinereadable passports that are tamper-resistant and incorporate biometric and document authentication
identifiers”). DHS was created by merging twenty-two different government organizations into a
single department. Because many of these organizations maintain autonomy and responsibility for
planning and managing their own biometric systems, DHS created the Biometrics Coordination Group
(BCG) to ensure department-wide coordination. History: Who Became Part of the Department?, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Apr. 11, 2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm.
161
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 28.
162
Id. at 29.
163
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE BIOMETRIC
STORAGE SYSTEM 3 (2007).
164
TRANS. SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT:
TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIAL (TWIC) PROTOTYPE 2 (2004).
165
Id.
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166

territories. After the 9/11 attacks, Congress, making national security as
important as criminal investigation, authorized the U.S. Attorney General
to expand IAFIS and other biometric services into the civil sector.167 In
2007, the FBI announced that it planned to spend over one billion dollars
to compile a biometric database, labeled Next Generation Identification
(NGI), that would consist of digital face images, fingerprints, palm
patterns, iris scans, and voice data.168 As of March 2010, NGI was going
through contractor testing and is scheduled to begin operation in early
2011.169 The FBI also coordinates with DHS to make both Departments’
databases interoperable.170 The FBI collaborates with the DOD obtaining
data received from military operations abroad and providing data collected
by the FBI.171
4. State Department
The State Department has also expanded biometric efforts since the
9/11 attacks. The Biometric Visa Program (BioVisa) mandates biometric
screening for visa applicants and requires the Department to use biometric
identifiers for all visas issued to aliens.172 In 2008, the State Department
transitioned BioVisa from the collection of two fingerprints to ten.173
These prints are then scanned against IAFIS, which also uses a tenfingerprint system.174 BioVisa also uses facial-recognition technology for
persons exempt from fingerprints during the application process.175
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NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 37.
Id.
168
Calvin Biesecker, Lockheed Martin Nabs FBI Contract To Develop Multi-Modal Biometric
Database, 237 DEF. DAILY, Feb. 13, 2008.
169
NGI Program Holding Close to Schedule, FBI Says, 6 TERROR RESPONSE TECH. REP., Mar. 3,
2010.
170
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 39.
171
Id. The FBI and the Department of Defense, for example, established the Automated
Fingerprint Identification System for the Afghani government, with fingerprint data collected on a
ninety-day mission in Afghanistan. Id.
172
Amendment to the Biometric Visa Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,323, 39,323 (July 8, 2010).
173
Interrupting Terrorist Travel: Strengthening the Security of International Travel Documents:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Paul Morris, Executive Director, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection).
174
See id. (“[T]he biometric and biographic data are checked against watch lists of known or
suspected terrorists, outstanding wants and warrants, immigration violations, and other criminal history
information.”); see also NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 46 (describing the search
process involving fingerprint scans and IAFIS’s criminal master file).
175
Individuals exempt from fingerprint collection include diplomats, certain government officials,
children under age fourteen, and persons over age eighty. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note
100, at 45. Their photographs are then checked against photograph watch lists to combat visa fraud and
catch wanted criminals or terrorists. Id.
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IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF NEVA AND THE
COLLECTION OF BIOMETRIC DATA
If enacted, NEVA would require the government to incorporate
biometrics data into SEEVS and E-Verify and to collect biometric data
from prospective workers. This collection raises the same legal issues that
arise when the government collects any information from its citizens:
whether such collection constitutes a violation of a prospective worker’s
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unwarranted and unreasonable
searches and seizures.176 The Fourth Amendment gives “the people [the
right] to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”177 Just as the Fourth Amendment
ordinarily requires that a police officer have a search warrant to search a
dwelling, the Supreme Court has stated that “‘no less could be required
where intrusions into the human body are concerned. . . .’”178 The Court
has also noted that “a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as reasonable.”179 Because biometric technology involves
collecting data from parts of an individual’s body and may reveal private
medical information about the individual,180 the use of such technology
could implicate the Fourth Amendment in two ways: (1) gathering
biometric evidence may constitute an intrusion into—and therefore a
Fourth Amendment search of—a person’s body; or (2) gathering biometric
evidence may reveal private medical information, violating an established
societal expectation of privacy.
A. Gathering Biometric Data Through E-Verify Does Not Appear To Be a
Fourth Amendment Search
The Supreme Court has held that fingerprinting is subject to the
requirements of the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth
Amendment.181 In Davis v. Mississippi, the Meridian, Mississippi police,
176
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address whether the collection of biometric data
constitutes a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Court has ruled that detaining a
suspect in a criminal investigation for the sole purpose of collecting fingerprints is a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969). Collection of biometric data
through E-Verify, however, would not fall under the Davis ruling because the data would not be used
for criminal investigatory purposes and the collection would not occur during a detainment.
177
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting the
above text of the Fourth Amendment and noting that “‘[a]t the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment
‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))).
178
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770
(1966)).
179
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
180
See infra notes 232–37 and accompanying text.
181
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 4 (1973) (citing Davis, 394 U.S. at 724).
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without warrants, detained at least twenty-four African American teenagers
at police headquarters when a rape victim could only describe her assailant
as a black youth.182 The police found fingerprints on the sill and borders of
a window that the victim alleged the assailant had used to enter her
home.183 The police detained the teenagers, questioned them, fingerprinted
them, and released them without charge.184 Davis, who had previously
worked as a “yard boy” for the victim, was eventually detained because a
set of his fingerprints—and a second set taken after he was again detained
overnight in jail in Jackson, Mississippi—matched the prints on the
window.185 The police used the prints at Davis’s trial over his objection,
and he was subsequently convicted of rape.186
Because the fingerprints were captured during an illegal detention, the
Court overturned Davis’s conviction, reasoning that “[d]etentions for the
sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no less subject [than arrests] to
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.”187 The Court did note,
however, that some narrowly-defined detentions without probable cause
might comply with the Fourth Amendment.188 But the Court declined to
determine whether “narrowly circumscribed [criminal investigation]
procedures” for obtaining fingerprints without probable cause would meet
Fourth Amendment requirements.189
Although Davis put detentions for the sole purpose of collecting
fingerprints for criminal investigation under the Fourth Amendment’s
constitutional umbrella of protection against unreasonable searches, in the
context of seeking employment, where the prospective worker is not
detained and her fingerprints are not used for criminal investigation, the
182

Davis, 394 U.S. at 722.
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 723.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 727. The Court relied on this same precedent in Hayes v. Florida. 470 U.S. 811, 814
(1985). In that case, police went to the house of the alleged assailant and threatened to arrest him if he
did not cooperate and go to the police station with them to be fingerprinted. Id. at 812. When the
prints matched those at the crime scene, Hayes was subsequently arrested, charged, and convicted. Id.
at 813. The Court held that there was no probable cause to arrest Hayes, that his fingerprints were
taken without consent, and that, therefore, the fingerprints “were the inadmissible fruits of an illegal
detention” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
188
Davis, 394 U.S. at 727.
189
Id. at 728. The Court noted that “[d]etention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less
serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police searches and detentions” because
capturing fingerprints “involves none of the probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that
marks an interrogation or search.” Id. at 727. Because the police only need one set of prints, the
detention could not be employed repeatedly to harass an individual, and because there is little danger of
fingerprints being destroyed, the police could schedule the detention at a convenient time for the
individual. Id. This dicta suggests that gathering fingerprints for the purpose of criminal investigation
may not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure in some instances, narrowing the Davis holding to, at
the very least, the facts of that case. Further, now that fingerprints can reveal medical information
about an individual, taking images of them may implicate more than just identification.
183
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Fourth Amendment likely would not apply. In Davis, the state forced the
defendant to record his fingerprints for its criminal investigation against
him. NEVA, however, does not force a prospective worker to give her
fingerprints. Rather, she would exchange them for the opportunity of
employment. Under this rationale, it is likely that a court would find that
requiring an applicant to submit biometrics data for employment does not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has already made a similar finding.
In Trade Waste Management Ass’n v. Hughey,190 the Third Circuit upheld
a New Jersey law that required prospective licensees to disclose
information, including fingerprints, in order to obtain a license to dispose
of solid and hazardous waste within the state.191 The law had been created
to prevent organized crime from having ownership interests in the wastedisposal industry.192 The fingerprints were taken from prospective
licensees and then crosschecked with the state and the FBI criminal
databases.193 The statute required that the state collect fingerprints from
business owners, stockholders, or beneficiaries of company funds to
them.194 The discovery of convictions of, or pending charges for, certain
crimes would result in a denial of the company’s application.195
The plaintiffs alleged that the fingerprinting requirement violated their
constitutional right to privacy.196 The Third Circuit, however, found that
the statute’s “fingerprinting requirement . . . . [wa]s not involuntary in the
[F]ourth [A]mendment sense. It [wa]s required only as a condition for
obtaining or keeping a license to engage in a business that the state may
license.”197 Moreover, the State may compel disclosure of private
information if its interest in such disclosure outweighs the individual’s
privacy interests, and because the law was rationally related to the
investigation of the licensees’ qualifications, which the court found to be a
compelling governmental interest, the court upheld the law.198
Just as the statutory scheme for the licensee program established in
Trade Waste used fingerprints to prevent participants in organized crime
from having ownership interests in the waste disposal industry, so too
would NEVA utilize the same technology to create an applicant-filter
program aimed at decreasing the “economic magnet” that draws illegal

190

780 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 228, 239.
192
Id. at 223.
193
Id. at 228, 233.
194
Id. at 224–25, 233.
195
Id. at 225–26. These crimes included murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery,
extortion, criminal usury, arson, burglary, theft, and other related crimes. Id.
196
Id. at 233.
197
Id. at 234.
198
Id.
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199

immigrants into the United States.
The legal principles of Trade Waste
should also apply to SEEVS. The requirement that prospective employees
submit to fingerprint scans would not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search because the fingerprints would be a condition precedent to obtaining
employment. Such a prerequisite to employment is not unlike requiring
suspicionless drug-testing of employees who apply for promotions, which
the Court has held is a reasonable Fourth Amendment search.200 Also,
unlike in Davis or in Hayes, the government would not detain or
fingerprint an applicant without consent.
Likewise, SEEVS is rationally related to the government’s interest in
securing national borders and discouraging illegal immigration.201
Fingerprinting would simplify the process of determining whether an
applicant is the person she claims, and would make it tougher for illegal
immigrants to commit fraud, because it would be harder to copy and use a
person’s fingerprint than it presently is to copy and use a person’s social
security number. The program would also relieve employers of the burden
of determining whether a person resembles the picture presented on her
legal documents, and it has the potential to alleviate errors that would only
occur in a system based purely on name and numbers.202
Like fingerprint collection, capturing iris images would also likely not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.203 The scan itself
commits no more of an intrusion into the body than a fingerprint scan.
Although the iris is a sub-dermal organ, the technology only measures and
records what is visible through the cornea.204 The process of recognition
appears less intrusive than a fingerprint scan to the user because, unlike
fingerprint or palm recognition, the user does not have to place the part
scanned on anything—she only needs to direct her eyes in a specified
direction.205 Iris scans are also much less intrusive than retinal scans,
199
See Harper, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that the “logic” Congress used in enacting the
Immigration Reform and Control Act was to “reduce the strength of [the] country’s economic
‘magnet’” by “making it illegal to hire an illegal immigrant”).
200
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
201
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
202
But see Feldman, supra note 143, at 663 (arguing that “[n]o biometric technique is completely
accurate”). Fingerprint scans could introduce new, complex error problems, and while generally
reliable, they may be misread if the user puts her finger at a different angle or pressure than the
fingerprint on file. Id. An automated finger scanner would be only as good as the humans who ran the
system, and human error will undoubtedly still play a role in SEEVS. Id. at 664.
203
There are no federal cases that address the question of whether an iris scan would constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment.
204
See WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 17 (“Iris
scanning measures the iris pattern in the colored part of the eye.”).
205
Of course, no matter how intrusive the process of iris recognition actually is, undoubtedly the
practice may feel more intrusive because the process carries a negative connotation, generated by
Hollywood movies such as Minority Report and Demolition Man. See Feldman, supra note 143, at
660–61 n.43 (listing movies and television shows that have portrayed iris scans). The American public
may therefore erroneously believe that iris scanning impedes on the private sphere more than
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which require measurements and copies of the veins contained inside the
eye wall.206 As the technology advances, recognition should take less time
and be accurate at longer distances.
Unlike fingerprints or patterns around the eye, an individual’s facial
features are exposed “regardless of the cooperation or compulsion of the
owner.”207 Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that “facial scars,
birthmarks, and other facial features” are “in plain view” and therefore are
not protected by the Fourth Amendment.208 Moreover, according to the
Second Circuit, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the
features on one’s face.209 It follows, then, that regardless of whether a
person is wrongfully detained or not, an individual’s facial features will
almost never be protected under the Fourth Amendment. If SEEVS
utilizes a facial recognition system, such a system should not fall within
the purview of a Fourth Amendment search.
B. If Gathering Biometric Data Through E-Verify Is a “Search,” It Is a
Minimal Intrusion to Prospective Workers and Involves a
Governmental Interest Outweighing Any Privacy Interest
Even if a court were to find that requiring an applicant to submit
biometric data for employment constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment, it may also find that a biometric submission would fall under
one of two exceptions: (1) administrative searches; or (2) “special needs”
searches.
1. The Administrative Search
Administrative searches include inspections of closely-regulated
businesses and extend to other routine regulatory investigations.210 For
example, in New York v. Burger,211 the Court held that a business owner’s
expectation of privacy is attenuated with respect to his commercial
property, where the business is “closely regulated.”212 In that case, a
fingerprint collection, even though current reports suggest that that data is used no differently than
fingerprint recognition. See WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS supra note 99,
at 26–27 (discussing a study, which suggests that managers of voluntary biometrics programs had no
concern for stigma, but that managers in mandatory biometrics programs may have had some concern
for stigma).
206
See WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 17
(explaining the differences between iris scans and retinal scans).
207
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 27 (1973).
208
See id. at 26 (citing United States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir. 1972)) (noting that, in
Davis, the Court held that fingerprints were protected by the Fourth Amendment, but that other courts
have found that facial features do not receive the same protection).
209
Doe, 457 F.2d at 898.
210
See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “‘administrative’
searches . . . include[] inspections of closely-regulated businesses”).
211
482 U.S. 691 (1987).
212
Id. at 700.
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warrantless search of a vehicle junkyard was upheld as reasonable because
of the diminished privacy interest of the business owner in his commercial
property and the state’s substantial interest in curbing automobile thefts.213
If a court upheld E-Verify as an administrative search, that court would
most likely find that the substantial governmental interest outweighed an
individual’s privacy interest. First, when a worker submits her personal
information to an employer, she arguably has a lower expectation of
privacy. She surrenders her home address, social security number, driver’s
license number, birth certificate information, and other identifying
documents to her employer, the SSA, and the IRS. Even if her information
may never leave these agencies, the worker still subjects herself to a lower
expectation of privacy. Likewise, the government’s interest in preventing
illegal employment increases substantially in the employer-employee
context.214 Given the degree of intrusion from a scan of the finger, face, or
iris, and the requirement of House Resolution 2028 that all biometric
information collection comport with privacy legislation,215 such an analysis
may very well fall against the worker.
It is unlikely, however, that a court will find that the employeremployee relationship and hiring process is a “closely regulated” business.
House Resolution 2028 would expand to employers already participating
in E-Verify, which include those not “closely regulated.”216 For an
administrative search exception to apply, the business must be “closely
regulated,” meaning “[c]ertain industries have such a history of
government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy . . .
exist[s] . . . .”217 To apply to the hiring process, a court would need to
stretch the definition of “closely regulated” business beyond its historical
context to incorporate a general business process. One would also have to
argue that the hiring process has a history of government oversight, which
has created little or no expectation of privacy. It is unlikely that such an
argument would be successful.
2. “Special Needs” Searches
Justice Blackmun established the “special needs” exception in New
Jersey v. T.L.O.,218 which upheld the constitutionality of a school
administrator’s search of a student’s purse after she had been observed
smoking in a school restroom.219 After T.L.O., courts use the special needs
213

Id. at 713–14.
See supra notes 7 and accompanying text.
215
See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
216
H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. § 102(a)(2) (2009).
217
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
218
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
219
See id. at 347 (majority opinion) (stating that the administrator’s decision to open the student’s
bag and “the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of marihuana dealing” were reasonable).
214
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doctrine to justify, in narrow contexts, searches made without a warrant or
individualized suspicion based upon “a careful balancing of governmental
and private interests.”220 The Court limits this test to “those exceptional
circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable.”221 For the special needs doctrine to apply, the primary
purpose of a search conducted by a school official must constitute a special
need beyond the normal need for law enforcement, and must outweigh the
privacy interest at stake and the character of the intrusion.222
A court may find that extracting biometric data to determine a
prospective worker’s citizenship status would be a “special needs” search
and therefore constitutionally permissible. First, Congress has a strong
interest in policing the national border.223 SEEVS’s purpose advances this
interest because it should substantially decrease an individual’s chances of
circumventing identification procedures and acquiring employment in the
United States.224 Second, the character of the intrusion is minimal.
Biometric automated systems may capture digital images of fingerprints
and irises, but those images are stored in the form of an algorithm and are
only used to compare with fresh data samples obtained by a user. E-Verify
would obtain biometric information for administrative purposes—
determining whether a prospective worker is hirable—and would not be
used as a tool of law enforcement. The biometric information would be
compared to information in a database, and, when there is no match, the
only consequence is a final nonconfirmation—the employer cannot legally
hire the worker.225
3. “Totality of the Circumstances” Analysis
The Supreme Court has recently expanded its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence by using a “totality of the circumstances” test to assess the
constitutionality of searches conducted without a warrant or individualized

220
Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why
Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843, 863–64 (2010) (explaining that “[i]n his
concurrence, Justice Blackmun set out a test that would be used in future cases”).
221
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
222
See Simmons, supra note 220, at 864–865 (explaining that the Court later loosened the special
needs doctrine to consider other factors such as expectation of privacy and the intrusiveness of the
invasion).
223
See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566–67 (1976) (finding that the
government’s interest in conducting suspicionless fixed-checkpoint vehicle stops outweighed a private
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests).
224
See supra notes 129 and 143 and accompanying text.
225
Note, however, that if the employer hires the worker, the worker may be detained if she is on
the employer’s premises during a DHS raid. See MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 4
(explaining how E-Verify works); Harper, supra note 5, at 5 (same).
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suspicion.
In United States v. Knights and Samson v. California,228
the Court declined to undertake a special needs analysis and instead
examined the “totality of the circumstances” of the search of a
probationer’s apartment with only reasonable suspicion and the search of a
parolee without any suspicion.229 Both searches under this lesser standard
were found to be reasonable.230 Although the subject matter of these cases
falls outside the scope of this Note, this expanded analysis is worth
highlighting because it “has provided a new method to judge the Fourth
Amendment constitutionality of government searches.”231 If a court
employs a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis in determining whether
NEVA’s biometric requirement constitutes a search, it is likely that the
relatively non-invasive and brief nature of capturing biometric information
would surmount the reasonableness threshold. A court, however, has yet
to use this analysis outside of the parolee-probationer search context.
C. Creating a Biometric Database Would Not Violate Privacy
Expectations
Unlike social security numbers, pin numbers, or passwords, biometrics
may contain medical information about an individual.232 The iris or retina,
for example, could reveal health conditions such as diabetes,
arteriosclerosis, and hypertension.233 Certain studies have suggested a link
between fingerprint patterns and homosexuality and that a number of
chromosomal disorders can affect the patterns of ridges in the finger.234
226
Charles J. Nerko, Note, Assessing Fourth Amendment Challenges to DNA Extraction Statutes
After Samson v. California, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 926 (2008).
227
See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121–22 (2001) (holding that a warrantless search
of a probationer’s apartment, supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of
probation, was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment given the totality of the circumstances, and
stating that “[a]lthough the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied
in the term ‘probable cause,’ a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of
governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable”).
228
See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852, 857 (2006) (holding that a suspicionless search
of a parolee did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that the “totality of the circumstances” must be
examined to determine whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
229
Nerko, supra note 226, at 926–27.
230
Id. at 926–28.
231
Id. at 930.
232
See WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 98, at 30 (stating
that “[b]ecause biometrics are inherent to the individual, researchers are likely to try to link medical
predispositions, behavioral types, or other characteristics to particular biometric patterns”); see also
Woodward, Biometric Scanning, supra note 115, at 115–17 (arguing that biometric scanning may
prompt various legal and policy concerns because it may incidentally capture information about
individuals’ medical history).
233
Woodward, Biometric Scanning, supra note 115, at 115.
234
See, e.g., P.E. Natekar & F.M. DeSouza, Digital Dermatoglyphics in Leprosy, 9
ANTHROPOLOGIST 63, 65 (2007) (discussing the results of a study that revealed leprosy may affect the
development of fingerprint ridges); Christopher Hernandez, Sexuality Is Genetic, Professor Argues,
DAILY PRINCETONIAN, Oct. 12, 2006, available at http://www.dailyprincetonian.com
/2006/10/12/16168/ (stating that “researchers . . . have examined fingerprint patterns, hypothalamus
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Should such information be disclosed when a user submits biometric
information, it would likely implicate a societal expectation of privacy and
constitute a “search” under the Katz doctrine.
Current technology is not capable of disclosing private medical
information from the biometric data collected.235 Existing biometric
systems do not observe biometric data as a human would, but rather
“translate information into a mathematical construction that has no
physiological meaning.”236 For such capabilities to exist, it would most
likely require a huge shift in the concept of biometric scanning
technology.237 Only then will those concerns be addressed.
Even if SEEVS could reveal private medical information about a user,
NEVA requires that all biometric data collected be encrypted and
segregated from the worker’s identifying information unless the worker
requests otherwise.238 SEEVS must also conform to existing privacy
laws.239 NEVA gives the worker the right to cancel enrollment at anytime
after the authentication process is over.240
When requested, the
cancellation removes the worker’s biometric information from SEEVS
without prejudice.241
Some courts allow storage of other kinds of information. For example,
several circuit courts have upheld the collection and storage of DNA
samples from convicts as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.242 In
size, the size differential between the second and fourth digit of the hand, pheromones and even the
sexuality of sheep”).
235
See Feldman, supra note 143, at 667 (explaining that “[i]t would take a significant
technological shift . . . to go from current biometric systems to systems that reveal disease or other
health information”).
236
Id. Retinal scans, for example, do not take images of the retina. Instead, they scan the retina
in a circle to create a one-dimensional pattern, which is then compared to other patterns contained in a
database. Id. Likewise, fingerprint scans are not based on direct comparisons of the images of
fingerprints. The system measures the arches and patterns of the fingers and formulates an algorithm,
which it then uses to determine if a fingerprint matches any print stored in the database. See
WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 16 (explaining that no
print of the finger is taken and that fingerprint sensors measure the spatial geometry of the finger).
237
Feldman, supra note 143, at 667.
238
H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. § 103(b)(2)(D) (2009).
239
Id. § 103(c)(3).
240
Id. § 103(b)(4)(C).
241
Id.
242
See United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “under Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard for analyzing the constitutionality of government searches and
seizures, the collection of DNA samples from individuals on supervised release is constitutional”);
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that “compulsory DNA
profiling of qualified federal offenders is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances”); United
States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that “[t]he DNA Act, while implicating
the Fourth Amendment, is a reasonable search and seizure under the special needs exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because the desire to build a DNA database goes beyond the
ordinary law enforcement need”); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that a
“reasoned interpretation of the ‘special needs’ doctrine support[ed] the constitutionality” of a
Connecticut statute that required, prior to the release of persons convicted of certain crimes, the
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those cases, the courts found that the government’s substantial interest in
collecting DNA samples from convicts, parolees, and probationers
outweighed the very limited expectation of privacy that a convict, parolee,
or probationer might have.243 Although the government’s interest in
collecting biometric information from prospective workers is arguably less
than its interest in collecting DNA samples from convicts, so too is
NEVA’s method of collection. In those cases, the government was
collecting blood and tissue samples, while E-Verify would simply scan the
image of a worker’s fingerprint or iris. Because NEVA’s method of
collection is substantially less intrusive than that required by the DNA Act,
a court, using the totality-of-the-circumstances test, could conclude it is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Biometrics presents a practical solution to the large gaps that plague a
crucial step in the worker verification process, namely, whether a worker is
who she claims to be. Given enough resources, E-Verify has the potential
to dramatically decrease the “employment magnet” that purportedly draws
illegal immigrants into the United States. First, defrauders will find it
more difficult to imitate biometric information. While biometrics will
undoubtedly not end employment fraud, it will substantially discourage the
majority of defrauders, who are capable of undermining existing
verification procedures, and increase the security of personal identification.
Second, biometrics will also relieve the employer’s burden of on-the-spot
worker identity verification. Instead of comparing document images of the
worker with the person presenting them, an employer need only use
SEEVS’s biometric option to legally comply with NEVA. Third, because
a biometric scan likely would not constitute a search under the
Constitution, mandating SEEVS would not implicate Fourth Amendment
protections. Existing technological capabilities and NEVA’s privacy
compliance requirement would ensure a worker’s constitutional privacy;
personal identity would not be compromised, while still maintaining a high
level of accuracy.
Before Congress can employ such a system, however, several concerns
must be addressed. Biometrics is still prone to human mistake and abuse.
The current E-Verify infrastructure, which was created for a small
voluntary program, would strain under a national mandate that would draw
in millions of new employers and workers. Americans are also likely to
disapprove of a biometrics requirement because of the stigma associated
collection of blood for “DNA . . . analysis to determine identification characteristics specific to the
person”).
243
Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 177; Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839; Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1146; Marcotte, 193
F.3d at 79–80.
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with the government’s use of the technology and ignorance of its
limitations. If it hopes to successfully implement any biometrics recording
regime, Congress first needs to educate the public on the technology’s
capabilities, and the system’s weaknesses and rates of error would have to
be mitigated. No doubt, a biometric employment verification system will
require cooperation and patience from employers and workers, but it has
the potential to significantly curb an illegal worker’s ability to gain
employment within the United States.

